Just as Peter Singer predicted in "Dearest Pet," the primarymainstream objection to bestiality, and to his essay, if the The NewRepublic and National Review Online are representative, is that sexbetween humans and nonhumans, regardless of the circumstances inwhich it occurs including rape, is "an offence to our status anddignity as human beings (5)." For Kathryn Lopez of National ReviewOnline the red flag is any suggestion that "humans ain't nothingspecial" ("Peter Singer Strikes Again," March 8). She seemed morethreatened by the prospect of shared speciality and by Singer's useof four-letter words than by what he had to say about what hens areput through by the egg industry-the institutionalized assault theyendure so nonvegetarians can eat their eggs--and about the sexualassaults some hens have been forced to undergo from an animal whosehands are as big as a hen's entire body. Likewise Peter Berkowitz ofthe The New Republic (March 8) complained that for Singer, itappeared that "the only consideration we need bear in mind in usinganimals to satisfy our sexual desire is whether we are causingcruelty," as if to say that cruelty (or at least cruelty to animals,like animals themselves in his view) amounts to little more than apesky footnote in the ethical account of humanity. Berkowitz seemedfar more aggrieved by the idea that other creatures have a dignitythat links us to them than by the cruelty we impose on them without ashred of compassion or restraint, which is exactly how hens aretreated by the egg industry in the case that Singer cited to show howdeeply woven into the fabric of human life human obscenity really is.
In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that has made blacks second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the black liberation movement and its initial, if limited, success made it a model for other oppressed groups to follow. We became familiar with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, gay people, and a variety of other minorities. When a majority groupwomenbegan their campaign, some thought we had come to the end of the road. Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally accepted form of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even in those liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their freedom from prejudice against racial minorities.
A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one groupusually the one to which we ourselves belongat the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our ownor, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species.
But what is this capacity to enjoy the good life which all humans have, but no other animals? Other animals have emotions and desires and appear to be capable of enjoying a good life. We may doubt that they can thinkalthough the behavior of some apes, dolphins, and even dogs suggests that some of them canbut what is the relevance of thinking? Frankena goes on to admit that by "the good life" he means "not so much the morally good life as the happy or satisfactory life," so thought would appear to be unnecessary for enjoying the good life; in fact to emphasize the need for thought would make difficulties for the egalitarian since only some people are capable of leading intellectually satisfying lives, or morally good lives. This makes it difficult to see what Frankena's principle of equality has to do with simply being human. Surely every sentient being is capable of leading a life that is happier or less miserable than some alternative life, and hence has a claim to be taken into account. In this respect the distinction between humans and nonhumans is not a sharp division, but rather a continuum along which we move gradually, and with overlaps between the species, from simple capacities for enjoyment and satisfaction, or pain and suffering, to more complex ones.
Animal Liberation (book) - Wikipedia
This result is not what the egalitarian philosopher originally intended to assert. Instead of accepting the radical outcome to which their own reasonings naturally point, however, most philosophers try to reconcile their beliefs in human equality and animal inequality by arguments that can only be described as devious.
Animal Liberation Theology 2 - Articles - The Writings …
The truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears to solve the egalitarian's problems only as long as it goes unchallenged. Once we ask why it should be that all humansincluding infants, mental defectives, psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the resthave some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of humans and other animals. In fact, these two questions are really one: talk of intrinsic dignity or moral worth only takes the problem back one step, because any satisfactory defence of the claim that all and only humans have intrinsic dignity would need to refer to some relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans possess. Philosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect, and worth at the point at which other reasons appear to be lacking, but this is hardly good enough. Fine phrases are the last resource of those who have run out of arguments.
Peter Singer Animal Liberation Essay - 499 Words
Since ancient times, people didn't have the culture of taking care of animals and still today that we have the knowledge and every kind of source of information, it is currently happening worldwide.